General Raheel Sharif by his
unequivocal announcement stands tall as a ‘man of dignity and unbending
principle’. There is no doubt that he has earned himself unanimous praise and
considerably enhanced the image of the Army. His supposedly premature
announcement came for the same reasons that have prompted writing of this piece.
Whereas the speculations about his retirement on the electronic media were
pretty innocuous, the discourse on the social media was getting more and more
frenzied and offensive. His aim was to quash all the speculations, which were
unnecessary, a waste of time and energy, directly implicating his person and
causing undesirable confusion in the civil-military relations. After his
announcement a flurry of theories for and against his extension has started to
clutter the social media space again. Each suggestion being offered has
implications that need deliberations.
As the conventional wisdom goes, extensions have seldom been good for an
organization, mostly nonproductive and at times counterproductive. No one is
indispensible. Charles De Gaulle is supposed to have remarked that ‘the
graveyard is full of the indispensible people’.
Iskander Mirza manipulated two extensions for Gen Ayub Khan. It was during the
second extension that Iskander Mirza was himself shown the door. Other than the
usurpers who continued to stay as the Army Chiefs, those who had extended
tenures were, Gen Muhammad Musa, eight years, Gen Tikka Khan, four years and Gen
Kayani, six years. Those whose tenure was cut short were, Gen Gul Hassan forced
by Bhutto to resign on gunpoint, Gen Asif Nawaz Janjua (died of heart failure)
and Gen Jehangir Karamat asked by Nawaz Sharif to resign.
The only General before Raheel Sharif who was offered extension which, he
politely refused was Gen Abdul Waheed Kakar. Later on he was perhaps offered a
job also that he refused saying in private that ‘there was no job better than
being the Chief of the Pakistan Army’. Gen Jehangir Karamat however, after his
retirement, accepted to be the ambassador of Pakistan to the United States.
When the dust had settled down on Hussain Haqqani’s schizophrenics, Gen Kayani
to the surprise of everyone was granted a wholesale extension of three years by
the PPP, President Zardari. This extension proved to be fruitless. That is
perhaps why both Mr Zardari and his party have so vociferously hailed Gen
Rhaeel’s announcement to retire on time.
In a country that has eternally suffered from ‘Qeht-ur-Rejal’ or drought of
genuine men, a powerful man willing to part with the glamour and privileges of
his post is indeed a pleasant surprise. But it takes that ‘Real Man’ to do it, a
man with convictions and self-respect. The lesser men are overwhelmed by the
glitter that goes with the centre stage. Gen Abdul Waheed Kakar was another such
personality. Gen Mirza Aslam Beg surprisingly went out as an unsung hero. He had
in the first place refused to take over the country after Gen Zia’s death when
offered to do so by the then Chairman Senate Ghulam Ishaq Khan but he also did
not take an extension, which, he could have pulled off rather easily.
But, there are operational requirements, which might be brought to the notice of
the Prime Minister. As opined by Lt Gen (retd) Abdul Qadir Baloch, the change of
command during a battle or campaign is not resorted to as a Principle of War.
During the 1965 war Gen Yahya Khan replaced Gen Akhtar Malik during an ongoing
battle. They say that Ayub Khan was alarmed by General Akhtar Malik’s popularity
as a war hero. Though Yahya Khan was no mean a professional, still the result of
this change amidst the battle certainly caused the unwanted delay and loss of
momentum that is essential to maintain for successful completion of an
operation. Similarly the change of the highest command during Zarb-e-Azb may
prove to be counterproductive. In the system any Lieutenant General who has
commanded a Corps should be able to serve as the Army Chief. It is the
intangibles of war that demand caution in this situation. The morale of the
common soldier is soaring; he seems to have developed an explicit trust in his
chief and the overall impact that Gen Raheel Sharif seems to have created on his
rank and file.
This situation poses a peculiar Command challenge to the Chief Executive. The
easiest option for him is to let the events take their course, select a new
Chief of the Army Staff and hope for the best.
Then come the media options mentioned above. One is to once again toy with the
idea of a more powerful Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (CJCSC) and
place Gen Raheel Sharif to head the organization. A four-star can only
coordinate with other four star generals, he cannot command them. Today, the
Chief can retire any rank at any time without assigning any reason. That is the
source of his absolute authority. Will the new post of the Chairman grant the
same power to the new CJCSC?
The second suggestion being forwarded is to extend the term in office of the
present Chief by at least one year. That carries multiple ramifications. One,
that he has already announced his decision not to take extension in routine. If
that difficulty is overcome by an amendment in the Constitution to enhance a
Chief’s tenure to four years, it will apply to all Services’ Chiefs. That is not
consequential. But the important implication is that presently the Lieutenant
Generals have four years’ tenure. If the Chief also has four years tenure, then
all the Lieutenant Generals promoted before his becoming the Chief would have to
retire in their present rank with no incentive left for enhancement in the
career. For the Military it is a closed option. That is why all the generals
senior to a chief automatically retire on his promotion. A Lieutenant General is
too high a rank to be left to halfhearted operators. If in turn a Lieutenant
General’s tenure is also extended say to five years, it is opening a Pandora’s
box with no end in sight.
The only practical options left with the Prime Minister if he really feels the
necessity, are, one that he tries to prevail upon Gen Raheel Sharif to stay for
one more year in the national interest or make such an amendment in the
Constitution that enables the Chief Executive to extend the tenure of an Army
Chief by one year at a time during emergencies only and make it mandatory for
the Army Chief to accept such an extension. To create a safeguard against a
whimsical decision of the powers that be, parliamentary participation of the
sort could be made essential before the Chief Executive took the crucial step.
This may be considered an impingement on the sole prerogative that the Prime
Minister enjoys today. But taking a decision without comprehensive in-house
discussions, inputs from the three Services and the CJCSC will create more
problems than it would solve.
(The author retired from Pakistan Army as Major General)