Whenever I read or hear
something related to military courts, the first thing that comes to mind is the
periods of martial law that Pakistan has experienced in its political history. I
have some scattered memories as a child of the martial law days under General
Ziaul Haq. In our rural setting of Punjab, the village folk used to sit in front
of a rare television set that usually telecasted images of the then Chief
Martial Law Administrator (CMLA). Indeed, the circumstances surrounding General
Zia’s death and later his funeral at Faisal Mosque were a good reflection of the
marathon transmission on the part of our state run television channel, PTV. In
those days, in the countryside, the common man was unaware of democracy,
constitutional rule, party politics and military courts. People in general were
more concerned with daily wages, prices of commodities and, at times, skirmishes
on our eastern boarder. Afghanistan was mostly seen from the prism of jihad
whose purpose they did not bother to reflect upon. Very interestingly, some of
the village elders viewed Ayub Khan’s martial law with awe in terms of provision
of agricultural facilities such as electricity tube wells. However, some were
very critical of General Yahya Khan for not fighting till the end during the
1971 war against India.
In our college days, in the purely urban settings of the late 1990s, political
discourse was entirely different from that of rural Pakistan. Masses were
divided along ethnic, sectarian, political and military lines. Even students
were deeply affected by such divisions. For example, the students politically
affiliated with the PML-N and Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) were often at loggerheads
with each other to control political space in educational institutions. Writers
and journalists were also divided with the majority in agreement with the
state’s narrative about domestic and foreign policy. Interestingly, Urdu
newspapers, as compared to English dailies, were found to be full of stories
telling the glorious Islamic past, puritan governance system under early
Muslims, resurgence of the Islamic world order and, of course, Pakistan playing
the lead role in such endeavours. Above all, the official syllabus we were
taught was largely in resonance with the above-mentioned.
Honestly, in those times I had no idea about freethinking or critical
appreciation of text and socio-political events. The world was linier then,
perhaps due to the overwhelming presence of a singular state-oriented narrative
that we know now. Perhaps owing to it, there was little hue and cry when the
then Prime Minister (PM), Nawaz Sharif, established anti-terrorism and military
courts in 1998. We, as students, were least bothered about such developments.
What I could remember was that the PM had a long fight with the then Chief
Justice (CJ) of Pakistan’s Supreme Court (SC). Also, the PM was not happy with
Altaf Hussain. There was either little coverage of the imbalance in
civil-military relations or we were too stupid to understand such sublime
categories and differences. Interestingly, we had no idea, despite the fact that
we were students of political science, if and when the SC judged the military
course unconstitutional. Moreover, we watched Kargil stories most of the time on
PTV in 1999. On October 12, the same year, PTV went off air. Lo and behold, when
transmission was back there was no PM, no Constitution and no democracy.
There was General Pervez Musharraf, martial law and of course (modified)
military courts. Shockingly, very few came onto the streets to protest in
Lahore, if not other parts of Pakistan. I was a BA student then at FC College,
Lahore. As was the case with my political memories during childhood, the
youthful years were no different: another martial law with more military
measures. Nevertheless, when Musharraf went for a referendum in 2001, we were
university students. We were lucky enough to have a couple of mentors who had
dedicated their lives to critical thinking and independent analysis in an
otherwise authoritarian and tradition-bound society and state.
Owing to the foregoing, we friends registered our silent protest by not casting
our vote at the rigged referendum. By this time, I was clear about the
ideological demarcation between democracy and dictatorship, critical and biased
thinking, rights and their violation, reason and revelation, public and martial
law, and civil and military courts. Above all, I, like others, encountered a big
puzzle: explaining why and how the military intervenes in (Pakistani) politics.
This question made me travel to Europe and it took me seven rigorous to address
it.
Methodologically, I assumed five cases (1958, 1969, 1977, 1999 and 2007) of
martial laws in Pakistan’s political history. To explain the puzzle, martial law
speeches, delivered on the very days by the respective CMLAs, were used as a
primary source. Each of the five coup proclamations tends to the
imposition of martial law on account of the following four reasons: poor
democracy, poor law and order, poor economy and poor defence. Now, if analysed
objectively, the provided justifications do not hold empirically. For example,
did Pakistan face Indian threat in October 1958 or July 1977? Was Pakistan’s
economy going down in 1969? Was there massive law and order problem in October
1999? If so, why did General Musharraf fail to solve law and order, for
instance, by November 2007? In today’s political and security context, we need
to think deeply about whether Pakistan’s (security) issues can be resolved
overnight with swift measures such as proposed military courts.
Based on Pakistan’s past experiences with military courts and given the norms of
parliamentary democracy, the idea of military courts, in my view, will be
counterproductive for the military itself. For instance, the present apex
judiciary will view them as an encroachment on its constitutional rights and
institutional space. Moreover, certain political parties such as the MQM are
likely to criticise them after a period of time. Smaller provinces and
territories will further question and criticise the increasing might of the
military in Pakistan’s internal policy. Even operationally such courts may face
tough challenges with regards to fair trial and death moratorium.
In view of the foregoing, Pakistani’s political and parliamentary leadership
along with the military top brass need to think of alternatives. Perhaps an
amendment to the Army Act (1952) may provide the desired results. Finally, for
Pakistan to stabilise itself against all sorts of challenges adherence to
democratic and plural practices is a must. Any aberration and adventure will be
costly.